

MEDIÁLNÍ STUDIA

MEDIA STUDIES

JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL MEDIA INQUIRY

Journalism Across Platforms: A Content Analysis of The Washington Post's Early Framing of Ukraine War Stories

Kirstin Pellizzaro & Madeleine Liseblad

To cite this article:

Pellizzaro, K., Liseblad, M. (2024). Journalism Across Platforms: A Content Analysis of The Washington Post's Early Framing of Ukraine War Stories. *Mediální studia*, 18(1), 75–96.

ISSN 2464-4846

Journal website: <https://www.medialnistudia.fsv.cuni.cz/>

1/2024

JOURNALISM ACROSS PLATFORMS: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF *THE WASHINGTON POST*'S EARLY FRAMING OF UKRAINE WAR STORIES

KIRSTIN PELLIZZARO & MADELEINE LISEBLAD

Arizona State University | California State University

ABSTRACT

News organizations utilize multiple social media platforms to garner the attention of various audiences. Every platform has different users, characteristics, and expectations. This exploratory study conducted a framing analysis of The Washington Post's initial content related to the Russia-Ukraine war on their Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Findings reveal frames on the conflict and how frames differ depending on the platform. Researchers discuss information implications for consumers depending on the platform they favor.

Keywords: framing ▪ qualitative research ▪ social media ▪ news ▪ war

1. INTRODUCTION

For the second time in the 21st century, the world witnessed Russia invade one of its European neighbors. The first time was the war in Georgia in the summer of 2008, and the second was the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war in Ukraine began brewing when pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich was ousted in 2014. Russia subsequently seized the southern region of Crimea, began deploying big numbers of troops to the Ukrainian border, and scrapped a peace deal (Kirby, 2022) before the invasion. Today, more than two years later, the war continues. Media outlets around the world have covered the war, including the almost 150-year-old United States legacy media outlet *The Washington Post*.

This research study focuses on *The Washington Post*'s coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The media outlet was selected for several reasons. The U.S. is one of the Group of Eight (G8) countries; it is considered to hold significant economic, political, military, and cultural influence on a global scale. *The Washington Post* is the premier media outlet in the U.S. capital, the political hotbed Washington D.C. The outlet is considered "agenda-setting...in the U.S." (Fleischer, 2023, p. 460), it is a well-respected journalistic publication globally, and it is in many ways at the forefront when it comes to social media use. Rudolph (2019) points out it is one of "the top five of the

newspapers read internationally, and the most commonly used by communication, political science, and policy studies scholars” (p. 314). It has bureaus in 26 locations around the world (*The Washington Post* announces newsroom..., 2020). Because of its status, *The Washington Post* is regularly used to research conflict outside of the U.S. For example, Fleischer (2023) and Ke (2008) used it to conduct framing studies to examine coverage of the Kosovo War and NATO’s involvement.

Being a legacy media outlet today - media business that dominated before the digital information age - takes a lot of navigation, searching for the audience. The internet and social media platforms have opened up channels for media outlets to connect with audiences in expanded ways, allowing for real-time two-way interaction. Gone are the days when print media could offer only a physical hard copy product and be successful. *The Washington Post* has flourished in this digital media age by offering news coverage on multiple platforms. They have focused on acquiring a young, digitally savvy audience via channels such as TikTok (Meek, 2021) and have thereby stayed relevant.

Because most media outlets today are active on several platforms, and because journalism aims to inform the public, it is of uttermost importance to examine and understand how a publication frames the same story on its different platforms. This research study sought to understand how *The Washington Post* covered the invasion of Ukraine across its social media channels Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Data was collected a week before the invasion and a week into the invasion, a time period when the framing of coverage can have a strong initial effect on an audience’s understanding of war and can quickly influence opinions. Through the lens of framing, an inductive content analysis finds unique differences in storytelling and message content across platforms, bringing concerns that how consumers understand the Russia-Ukraine conflict depends on which platform they favor.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The Russia-Ukraine conflict

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it was described as the “most aggressive move yet to redraw the boundaries of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War” (Hookway & Trofimov, 2022, para. 1) in the late 1980s. Some argue Putin had been slowly re-erecting that Cold War curtain and media outlets compared Russia’s military equipment rolling into Ukraine to the Soviet Union’s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia (Moore, 2022).

Ukraine was a part of the former Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Putin “regards the Ukraine and Russia as inseparable” (Miranda, 2002, para. 12). He justified the invasion by saying they were defending Russian-speakers in Ukraine, especially those in the self-declared republics that left Ukrainian control in 2014 - Donetsk and Luhansk. The invasion may also be fueled by Ukraine’s interest in

joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), something Putin has seen as a hostile act against the Soviet Union (Miranda, 2022). Countries around the world called for various sanctions against Russia, including trade sanctions, athletic events being moved, and no-fly zones being established.

Putin and Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelensky, have been pitted against one another and compared for leadership styles. Zelensky, described as a "comedian who had no experience of politics when elected" (Mulvey, 2022, para. 1), has now become a household name and a "symbol of resistance and unity" (Adler, 2022, para. 1). He has successfully navigated social media with his openness and selfie-type videos and is seen in stark contrast to Putin. Putin instead has used awkward official photos and long pre-recorded speeches where he rambles (Adler, 2022).

The Russia-Ukraine war has been dubbed the "TikTok War." As Dang and Culliford (2022) point out, the social media platform is very influential with Gen Z. TikTok's algorithm provides trending content regardless of who a person happens to follow, which means topics can easily go viral. Chayka (2022) described how a TikTok video showing missiles falling over Kyiv had over nine million likes. The video followed TikTok norms that Chayka (2022) described as "choppy, decontextualized, with catchy pop music in the background" (para. 2). Chayka (2022) explained how TikTok content has "permeated the collective consciousness, providing some of the earliest and most direct glimpses of the Russian invasion" (para. 2).

Dang and Culliford (2022) say TikTok has a central role, even becoming "so influential in this conflict that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed to 'TikTokers' as a group that could help end the war, in a speech directed at Russian citizens" (para. 6). But it is not only Zelensky that understands the importance of the TikTok audience. So does the Biden administration. In March 2022, 30 TikTok stars were invited to a Zoom meeting with U.S. National Security Council staffers and the White House press secretary. Topics included information about the war, American strategic goals and partnerships, how the U.S. would act if Russia used nuclear weapons, and distributing aid to Ukraine (Lorenz, 2022).

Because of *The Washington Post's* reputation as a leading legacy media outlet on the TikTok platform, it was ideal for a research study on the Russia-Ukraine war. *The Washington Post* has covered the conflict from a wide variety of angles on its various social media platforms. It is also the premier media outlet in the capital of the United States, a country that is viewed as highly influential globally, on many levels. *The Washington Post* is commonly used by global communication, political science, and policy studies scholars and has been used in many studies to examine global conflicts.

2.2. The Washington Post

The Washington Post has a long history, dating back to December 6, 1877. It began as a Democratic daily newspaper, started by then 38-year-old Stilson Hutchins (Roberts, 1989). Hutchins launched the newspaper "because he knew...that a Washington

newspaper could command the daily attention of power in all branches of the national government” (Roberts, 1989, p. 5). In the 1880s, Hutchins gave up the Democratic slant and started describing *The Washington Post* as independent (Stabile et al., 2010).

Events that cemented the newspaper on the international media map include publishing the Pentagon Papers and breaking the Watergate scandal that brought down President Richard Nixon. Today the newspaper has a wide circulation. It has gone from a local newspaper to a global media company and is now one of the “most respected and influential news outlets” (Stabile et al., 2010, p. 577) in the United States.

By using news and digital platforms, legacy media still play a crucial information role today, especially when it comes to political events (Langer & Gruber, 2021). *The Washington Post* - as a legacy media company - has diversified and expanded its platforms, including the recent innovative use of TikTok as an information tool. In fact, according to Axios Media Trends, *The Washington Post* has the second largest following (1 million) on TikTok for U.S. legacy news outlets, next to CBS News (2 million) (Fischer, 2022). However, *The Washington Post* is thought to have a more engaged following due to its “wonderfully weird, witty, and topical” (Gallucci, 2021, para. 2) content that mixes pop culture with hard news. Dave Jorgenson, known as “*The Washington Post* TikTok guy,” created the legacy paper’s account in May 2019. Jorgenson developed a “self-deprecating,” “dad joke” approach on the platform that won over followers. The TikTok account has gained enough prestige at *The Washington Post* and online that it is now run by a team of three - Jorgenson and two others (Gallucci, 2021; Joseph Ferguson joins..., 2024).

2.3. Social media

A newspaper like *The Washington Post* has its regular print edition, but also a website and numerous social media channels. The outreach on different channels is because a media outlet needs to reach audiences, and the demographics on different platforms tend to be slightly different. In other words, *The Washington Post* needs to diversify its channels so that it can reach a larger audience, both in size and demographics.

According to Matsa and Liedke (2022), in 2022 basically one-third of American social media consumers received their news on Facebook (31 percent). This was followed by YouTube with 25 percent, X/Twitter¹ with 14 percent, Instagram with 13 percent, TikTok with 10 percent, and Reddit with 8 percent. LinkedIn and other platforms have less of an audience (Matsa & Liedke, 2022). A year later, Matsa (2023) found that while news consumption on most social media platforms have stayed the same, TikTok is the exception. In three years, the share of U.S. adults getting regular news on TikTok has gone from 3 percent in 2020 to 14 percent in 2023. On a global scale, user information tends to be similar. Newman (2023) found that while

¹ Twitter was rebranded as X in summer 2023.

Facebook is one of the most used social platforms, TikTok is growing rapidly, in particular in Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. About half of the top, global publishers are now creating content on the TikTok platform (Newman, 2022).

Diving deeper into the statistics, it is clear that the Facebook audience is older, with 30–49-year-olds as the largest regular social media news user audience. Also, Facebook has the largest share of 50–64-year-olds and 65+ than the other popular platforms. TikTok and Instagram have their largest news audiences in the 18–29 range (Matsa & Liedke, 2022). According to Newman (2023), TikTok reaches as much as 44 percent in the 18–24 range globally. Of those, 20 percent tune in to TikTok for news content. Barnhart (2022) noted that almost 40 percent of Generation Z say they are influenced by items they see on TikTok, and it is currently the fastest-growing social media platform. Essentially, platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok are generally for people under 30. However, the bulk of people with real spending power tend to be on Facebook, YouTube, and X/Twitter. These statistics highlight the need for media outlets to be diverse in their social media outreach.

Because the audience is diverse on various social media platforms, this study seeks to look deeper at *The Washington Post's* Ukraine social media coverage. Instead of examining several media outlets, this study examines how one media outlet frames messages across platforms. This approach was selected because of the importance of the information function of journalism. The authors want to examine how one topic is framed by one media outlet across its platforms to understand similarities and differences in that framing. Of utmost concern is if the framing on the different platforms is creating potential information gaps for audiences.

The Washington Post's coverage was examined on three social media platforms - Instagram, TikTok and Facebook. Facebook is, despite its various controversies, the social media platform with the largest number of followers. Established in 2004, Facebook currently has an estimated 2.91 billion users, while Instagram has 2 billion users. TikTok, the 2016 newcomer on the social media scene, only has 1 billion users. However, as Barnhart (2022) points out, TikTok's growth is unprecedented with users spending 89 minutes/day on the platform. This is to compare to Facebook and Instagram, that users spend roughly 30 minutes/day on.

Not only does a different general audience exist on each platform, but each platform has different characteristics and audience expectations. For example, Facebook and X/Twitter posts often consist of text and a generated image from a web link. However, both platforms can also host video. Instagram was created to be the visual platform, with its feeds filled with beautiful photos. It is thought of as a haven for artists or makers to display their talents. The platform also hosts videos through reels or stories. TikTok, a reinvention of the short-form video, has developed a reputation for entertainment value. Videos are a compilation of pop music, memes, filters, and dance challenges, etc., mainly focused on pop culture trends. While all platforms can host text, photos, and videos - they do not look or feel the same based on each platform's technical capabilities and the reputation of content it has developed.

Therefore, the same information from news outlets may read, sound, or generally feel different depending on the platform hosting the content.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Framing theory provided the structure for the analysis of *The Washington Post* stories. It was selected because media coverage contains powerful frames that can influence opinions (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2019; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Tuchman (1978) described news as a window to the world, “and through the news frame, Americans learn of themselves and others...” (p. 1) while Lecheler and de Vreese (2019) explained that news frames stress certain aspects of reality.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) found that factors that are internal to journalism determine how journalists and news organizations frame certain issues. News frames are like a road map (Goffman, 1974), creating a structure that elements are built on (Capella & Jamieson, 1997). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) describe framing as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them” (p. 143). Entman (1993) explained that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations” (p. 52). Essentially, as de Vreese (2005) stated, “a frame is an emphasis in salience of different aspects of a topic” (p. 53).

Scheufele (1999) distinguished media frames from individual frames. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) explained a media frame as a “set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue” (p. 3), while Kinder and Sanders (1990) explained that individual frames are “internal structures of the mind that help individuals to order and give meaning to the dizzying parade of events” (p. 74). Scholars examining media frames have found two categories: generic and issue specific. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) describe generic frames as being broad and structural themes. They are generally limited to items such as conflict and human interest. Issue specific frames vary depending on the content and the context being examined (de Vreese, 2005). General frames that journalists tend to use include the conflict frame that portrays adversarial dynamics, the human-interest frame that emotionalizes events, the morality frame that highlights morality issues, the responsibility frame that connects events with consequences or solutions, and the economic impact frame that highlights financial impact (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

Studies on framing in the news tend to draw on working or operational definitions of frames that are designed for a specific study. That means there is not a consensus on how to identify news frames (de Vreese, 2005). Some scholars have taken a deductive approach where frames are defined prior to the examination. However, many studies are inductive, meaning that they do not analyze news articles with frames that are defined prior to the study. Instead, they use frames that emerge

from the examination of the material. Furthermore, many scholars support using an inductive approach, in particular when studying events. For example, using an inductive approach, van Dooremalen and Uitemark (2021) focused on the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the coverage in American, French and Dutch national newspapers, and Iannarino et al. (2015) analyzed coverage in U.S. evening news of the 2011 Japan nuclear crisis.

For this study, the inductive approach was best because of the fluid situation, the cross-platform examinations that were needed, and because the researchers wanted to study both visual and textual frames in messages. The inductive approach allowed the researchers to identify the frames that emerged from the data. It was important to the researchers to allow the data to speak for itself versus trying to fit the data into predetermined frames.

Framing theory has been used to examine messages on many platforms and it has been used to examine media and war. Furthermore, many scholars have used framing theory to examine *The Washington Post's* coverage of war and conflict. For example, both Fleischer (2023) and Ke (2008) used framing theory to analyze *The Washington Post's* coverage of the Kosovo War and NATO's involvement. They used *The Washington Post* because of its status as a premier global media outlet. Fleischer (2023) found that *The Washington Post* essentially manufactured consent in support of NATO's involvement, and Ke (2008) concluded the publication had missed important information in the war and did not report several incidents in a timely enough manner. Other studies aimed at *The Washington Post* and framing include Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) studying the Bosnian crisis, Gruley and Duvall (2012) looking at the Darfur conflict, Porpora et al. (2010) reviewing the Iraq war and prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Rudolph (2019) examining human rights in North Korea, and Sotiraki (2023) studying the Russia-Ukraine war.

Research examining war using framing theory includes Alitavoli (2020), who examined Syrian war articles on an alternative news website and a mainstream news site and found differences in the consistency of the themes used, with the alternative news site being more consistent. Mhanna and Rodan (2019) used framing theory to examine newspaper articles published by mainstream Australian media outlets about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. They found that a conflict frame was dominant in both newspapers. Guzman (2016) examined U.S. news media frames in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and found that frames between CNN and Fox News fluctuated, but overall, the frames reflected U.S. ideology that democracy is better than authoritarian rule. Carpenter (2007) analyzed frames in newspapers during and after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. She found that while the frames and inclusion of international, national, and local sources differed, the inclusion of military sources was basically balanced across newspapers. Keith et al. (2009) examined print, broadcast, and online visuals of the Iraqi invasion and found distinct differences in the images that were published across media platforms. Schwalbe et al.

(2018) explain that “studying framing across media platforms matches how media producers are presenting content” (p. 235).

Publishers tend to present the same stories differently, depending on the platform, and studies have shown that a relationship between news framing and media formats and platforms exists. This exploratory study is innovative as it focuses on one media outlet's - *The Washington Post* - framing of news stories about one significant event across multiple platforms. Because of its unique blend as not only an American legacy media outlet but also a cutting-edge, innovative outlet - for example, because of its ingenious use of new platforms such as TikTok - *The Washington Post* offers a unique scenario that warrants scholarly inquiry. As stated by Schwalbe et al. (2018), looking at frames across media platforms can highlight media messaging differences from an organization, as well as track differences across platforms.

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Due to audience demographics differing across platforms, as well as social media platforms having different characteristics and audience expectations, this exploratory study seeks to understand if *The Washington Post's* frames of the Russian invasion of Ukraine differ across Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. This study analyzes if the coverage of the beginning of the conflict plays out differently, depending on the platform one is using to consume content. In turn, the study asks:

RQ1: What early frames emerged of the Russia-Ukraine war from *The Washington Post's* social media platforms?

RQ2: Do textual and visual frames of the Russia-Ukraine war differ across *The Washington Post's* social media platforms?

5. METHODOLOGY

The researchers conducted an inductive content analysis of *The Washington Post's* early frames of the Russia-Ukraine war. Data was collected from February 17, 2022, to March 3, 2022 - a week before the invasion of Ukraine and a week into the invasion - to get a sense of how frames changed after the invasion began. This was a time period when the framing of coverage could have an initial effect on the audience's understanding of the war, quickly influencing their opinions about the event. The unit of analysis was the media outlet's social media posts on their owned Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok platforms.

On all platforms, a post can consist of textual and visual frames in a variety of different ways. The biggest issue is text often overlays images or videos, particularly in Instagram and TikTok content. Therefore, it was important for the researchers to define what to consider text and what to consider a visual. Across all platforms, the caption of a post was considered text. Defining visuals was more complicated.

On Facebook, a post can consist of text in a caption, image, or video. For example,

the majority of *The Washington Post*'s Facebook content consisted of a link to an article housed on their website. Facebook generates that link into a visual containing an image with a headline. Because the headline is generated as part of the image, the researchers consider it part of the visual frame.

In an Instagram feed, content can consist of a card (one image), a carousel (up to 10 images one swipes through), or a video. Text can overlay photos and videos on this platform, separate from the caption. Therefore, the text contained within the images was coded as part of the visual. The same was done for TikTok videos.

To simplify the data, the researchers only looked at Instagram posts in the feed, not Instagram stories. Instagram stories disappear after 24-hours unless they are put into Instagram highlights. At the time of the study, *The Washington Post* was not utilizing the highlight feature to curate their Russia-Ukraine Instagram stories. Therefore, the researchers only collected stories in the feed that do not disappear unless deleted by *The Washington Post*. Also, the researchers collected X/Twitter data but found that *The Washington Post* repeated the same content on Facebook and X/Twitter, seeing that the structure of both platforms' feeds is very similar. Therefore, at this time, although X/Twitter data was collected, the researchers chose to only focus on Facebook posts as it has a larger audience. Furthermore, the researchers collected web articles that were linked to posts, but for this study the articles were not analyzed. Again, the unit of analysis was the post contained within social media platforms.

Data for Facebook, X/Twitter, and TikTok was captured by the researchers by taking screenshots of every post, or screen recordings if the post contained video, related to the war every day. Instagram data was collected using Picodash, an Instagram data collection tool. There was a total of 392 Facebook posts (70 before, 322 after the invasion), 97 Instagram posts (13 before, 84 after the invasion), and 19 TikTok posts (3 before, 16 after the invasion). Data was organized in an Excel file containing a link to the post, the date of the post, the caption, and a link to the screenshot or recording.

When conducting the inductive content analysis, researchers looked for the dominant textual and visual frames only. This is in line with Keith et al.'s (2009) coding scheme focusing on dominant frames. For example, the imagery that appeared most in a video or the imagery that appeared most in an Instagram Carousel. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, only the dominant theme in a post's text and visual(s) was recorded at the time.

The researchers conducted a preliminary content analysis, both coding 10 percent of the content. Then, they came together to determine if they found similar frames. After finding consistency, the researchers split the data and continued the analysis. Due to the large amount of data collected during the week after the invasion on Facebook and Instagram, the researchers randomized the data and analyzed them until they reached saturation. This was not necessary in the week leading up to the invasion on Facebook or Instagram, nor with the TikTok data, due to the small amount of

content collected during the time frame. Next, the researchers reviewed the frames that emerged across platforms to determine any differences.

6. FINDINGS

Research Question 1 asked what frames emerged of the Russia-Ukraine war from *The Washington Post's* social media platforms. Several frames emerged during *The Washington Post's* initial coverage of the war. Table 1 lists the textual frames and Table 2 lists the visual frames that emerged from the inductive qualitative analysis.

In the week leading up to the invasion, coverage was small compared to the week after, as is expected. In the seven days before February 24, 2022, the most dominant textual and visual frames were Figure Heads, Economic Impacts (i.e. sanctions) and Military/Political Movement. In the first week of the invasion, the former remained dominant textual and visual frames with the addition of Refugees/Civilians, Fact-Checking, Reporters, Explainers, Anti-War Protests, and Opinion Pieces. The majority of visual frames reflected the textual frames with the addition of Humor, which was only found on TikTok. Also, there were no visual representations of Opinion found on any platform.

It is important to note that the visual frame of Humor on TikTok was much more prevalent before the invasion, but did make appearances after the invasion, though in a much smaller way. In fact, *The Washington Post's* TikTok team recognized that their content would need to shift tone and posted a video on February 28, 2022, explaining their move to more hard news with less humor to cover the war (*The Washington Post*, 2022c) stating:

“This will include more footage from our brave colleagues on the ground in Ukraine and plenty of TikToks explaining what’s happening on a daily basis. And if you’re like Sam [referring to a can of spam with googly eyes] and have some questions, comment below. We’ll do your best to answer as many questions as we can sourced directly from Washington Post reporting.”

However, smaller, humorous instances were still found within the content. For example, the mention of “Sam” in the above-mentioned video was an inside joke for *The Washington Post's* TikTok fans. Sam refers to a can of Spam with the “P” blacked out, googly eyes, and a paper hat made from a newspaper clipping. Sam is often an easter egg of sorts, found in the background of many of *The Washington Post's* TikTok videos.

Table 1: Textual Frames

Frame	Mentions of:	Platform
Figure Heads	Putin, Zelensky, Biden, Trump, U.S./NATO/China Officials - their thoughts on the conflict or analysis of their actions	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Refugees/ Civilians	What they are doing: fleeing, sheltering, made it to safety, making food, other military support items	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Economic Impact	Mentions of economic sanctions on Russia, citizens boycotting Russian products, what sanctions mean for U.S. economy; potential cyber attacks	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Fact- Checking	Fact-checking viral images or videos; mentions of misinformation	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Military/ Political Movement	Military or political moves made by Ukraine, Russia or U.S./NATO	Facebook, Instagram
Reporters	Experiences of <i>The Washington Post's</i> reporters on the ground	Facebook, Instagram
Explainer	Explanation of military terms or list of current sanctions	Facebook, Instagram
Anti-War Protests	Protest in Russia or by Ukrainian allies	Facebook
Opinion Pieces	Contempt for authoritative rule/sympathy for democracy, Black voices, dangers of colonialism, and other takes on what this war means for our society/world	Facebook

Note. Textual frames found through an inductive content analysis.

Table 2: Visual Frames

Frame	Images of:	Platform
Figure Heads	Putin, Zelensky, Biden, Trump, EU/NATO/Chinese officials, or CEOs of major companies	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Refugees/ Civilians	Refugees fleeing, sheltering, making it to safety, or civilians that stayed to make food or other military support items	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Economic Impact	Money, stock market, or business logos	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Fact- Checking	Viral images deemed misinformation, with text or audio for context	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Military/ Political Movement	Military equipment, bombings, city scenes of destruction, soldiers, maps of Ukraine indicating changes in military movement	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Reporters	<i>The Washington Post's</i> reporters on the ground in Ukraine; or <i>The Washington Post's</i> TikTok team members at home or office	Facebook, Instagram, TikTok
Explainer	Solid background with text (i.e. Instagram card or carousel)	Facebook, Instagram
Anti-War Protests	Protesters in Russia or Ukrainian allied countries; Ukrainian flags, sunflowers	Facebook, Instagram
Humor	Use of humorous acts through video, sound, and images	TikTok

Note. Visual frames found through an inductive content analysis.

Research Question 2 asked if textual and visual frames of the Russia-Ukraine war differed across *The Washington Post's* social media platforms. As is visible in the third column in Tables 1 and 2, many of the textual and visual frames are found across all platforms: Figure Heads, Refugees/Civilians, Economic Impact, and Fact-Checking. However, some differences were found.

First, although the researchers found the Economic Impact frame across all platforms, it was most prevalent on Facebook and Instagram. While TikTok videos would quickly mention a new sanction, Facebook and Instagram posts would take deep dives into what these sanctions mean for Russia, but mostly what they mean for U.S. citizens. Further, while the Fact-Checking frame was found in Facebook and Instagram posts, it dominated many TikTok posts. Of the 16 TikTok videos posted after the invasion began, seven included the Fact-Checking frame; 44 percent of *The Washington Post's* TikTok coverage.

Next, TikTok videos included visual frames of military movements – showing military equipment, bombings, city scenes of destruction, and soldiers. They did not include textual frames of military or political movements. There were no mentions of moves being made by military or political powers in the war. Also, TikTok coverage was unique by being the only platform that told the news solely through the reporters on the ground or from the studio back home. Of the 19 TikTok videos, all but one showed and used a reporter as the face of the story, much like a standard broadcast video package. This differs from Facebook and Instagram where the majority of content was either a post linking back to an article housed on *The Washington Post's* website or photos with embedded text.

A unique characteristic of Instagram was the use of the Explainers. Many Instagram carousels and captions were used to educate the audience on military terms or list current sanctions with only a black background and text for the visual. This frame was also found on Facebook, but the majority was found on Instagram.

A distinctive finding on Facebook was the use of Opinion Pieces and Anti-War Protests. *The Washington Post* only posted opinion pieces to their Facebook account. Further, textual representation of the Anti-War Protest was found in Facebook captions, but visual representation was prevalent on Instagram with the use of Ukrainian flags and sunflowers. Lastly, as stated above, TikTok was the only platform to use Humor.

7. DISCUSSION

Media coverage contains powerful frames that bring salience to certain points of a story and can influence opinions (de Vreese, 2005; Lecheler & de Vreese, 2019; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). What makes a frame is linked to internal journalistic factors like workflow, sources, and editing (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). As the researchers moved through *The Washington Post's* early social media content of the war, we were reminded of Marshall McLuhan's notion that the "medium is the message." Every platform has a unique audience, characteristics, and expectations, meaning

not only is the practice of journalism creating frames, but the utility and use of social media platforms by a news consuming audience is influencing how the news is told and, in turn, the opinions of a given audience. The current study found, depending on what platform you are using to consume *The Washington Post's* content, it may influence your understanding of the Russia-Ukraine war.

In the early coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, some of the frames that Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identified as general frames journalists use during the conflict - adversarial dynamics, human interest, and economic impact - could be seen on all three platforms. Similar, yet unique to Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) adversarial dynamics, the researchers found many social media posts framed around a single Figure Head. Rather than one post being about major players going head-to-head, the dominant textual and visual frame would be about one particular figure head. For example, on March 2, 2022, on *The Washington Post's* Instagram, they posted an image of Putin with the headline "What's Putin Thinking?" (*The Washington Post*, 2022g). The caption is an analysis of why Putin is making particular military moves in Ukraine. On that same day in a separate post, we see an image of Zelensky with the headline "Assassination plot against Zelensky was foiled and unit sent to kill him was 'destroyed'..." (*The Washington Post*, 2022b). Figure 1 shows how two different posts on the same day focus on one figure head rather than pitting the two together in one textual and visual frame.



Figure 1: *The Figure Head Frame*

Note. Two Instagram posts on the same day (March 2, 2022) focus on one figure head at a time (*The Washington Post*, 2022g; *The Washington Post*, 2022b).

One must remember that at this point in time, Instagram users were at the mercy of the algorithm. Therefore, depending on where these posts landed in a consumer's

feed or how far one scrolls in one's feed, one might consume information about one figure head but not the other.

Similarities to Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) human interest and economic impact frames were also found. The researchers found frames of Refugees/Civilians on all three platforms. There was great focus on the citizens of Ukraine and what they were doing, whether that was images and texts about them fleeing or sheltering in place, making it safely across the border to Poland, or of many staying to support their military by making food or Molotov cocktails.

Further, this study also found an Economic Impact frame across all platforms. However, here is where researchers began to see differences in frames among platforms. Post captions of economic sanctions on Russia took a much deeper dive into what sanctions mean for the U.S. economy on Facebook and Instagram versus TikTok. For example, captions on Facebook read, "Wheat and seed oil exports could be dramatically impacted, and it could take years before a return to normalcy because of disrupted planting schedules," and "Investors are braced for economic whiplash as sanctions add a new dynamic to the volatility that has largely defined trading in 2022." While on TikTok, the three posts that touched on Economic Impact were much more surface level, only listing new sanctions for their viewers. For example, a caption read, "Western companies are cutting ties and suspending business dealings as the conflict continues in Eastern Europe (03/01/22) #bp #gm #shell." The accompanying video uses humor, showing a member of *The Washington Post's* TikTok team standing in front of images containing British Petroleum, General Motors, and Shell logos, holding up their hand in a peace sign or waving goodbye, and then walking out of the frame, as if saying "peace out" to Russia (*The Washington Post*, 2022f).

The Washington Post clearly understands the difference in audience on each platform. The Facebook and Instagram general audience is much older than TikTok's. In turn, the older platforms have an audience with much more spending power than the latter - an audience much more concerned with what this war means for their bottom line. Therefore, it makes sense for *The Washington Post* to focus more on the Economic Impact frame on Facebook and Instagram, because the content is much more likely to be relevant to the audience on those platforms. TikTok users being much younger and with little spending power, coupled with the platform's reputation of being used for entertainment value, makes the small mention of sanctions with no explanation of consequences understandable. However, the lack of effort to educate a younger generation on the potential implications of sanctions on the U.S., their parents or guardians, is concerning in the long run. This could mean a fairly serious gap in the younger generation's understanding of what is at stake during the war.

Another difference found in frames across platforms was the focus on fact-checking on TikTok versus Facebook or Instagram. After the invasion of Ukraine began, *The Washington Post's* TikTok team knew a change in their content's tone was needed. As mentioned earlier, this change to cover the war included a video explaining their move to more hard news with less humor (*The Washington Post*, 2022c). After their

initial warning to their audience, the TikTok team spent much time and effort trying to warn their users of misinformation about the war. Several videos walk users through manipulated video, how the TikTok team was able to verify the authenticity or lack thereof, and how TikTok users can verify other videos themselves. Captions read, “No matter how devastating, enlightening or enraging a post is, wait to share it. Assume everything is suspect until you confirm its authenticity. #euphoria #medialiteracy” (*The Washington Post*, 2022d), “A guide to watching videos with a critical eye. #factcheck” (*The Washington Post*, 2022a), and “Reply to @krystalm4 Reuters fact checked the images, saying they do not show Zelensky fighting. (03/03/22) #factcheck #medialiteracy #osint” (*The Washington Post*, 2022e).

It is clear that *The Washington Post*'s TikTok team of three recognized that they had an important role in the “TikTok War” - to help squash misinformation. Although the time periods of the studies are slightly different, this study's findings are in line with Sotiraki (2023) who used framing theory and a content analysis of *The Washington Post*'s TikTok coverage during the first two weeks of the Russia-Ukraine war. Sotiraki (2023) found the main coverage categories to be verification and misinformation, and says it is evident *The Washington Post* used a “proactive approach to resolving verification hurdles and disinformation concerns” (p. 5).

The generation that uses TikTok the most is a generation that tends to go to social media for news versus legacy media. The Poynter's MediaWise project has a separate teen fact-checking network because they and their partners recognize the importance of this generation needing to become better fact-checkers (Boney, 2019; Poynter, n.d.). Several countries have started media literacy efforts as a part of their school curriculums as they realize they must help the younger generation combat information issues (Fedorov, 2014; Zhang et al., 2020). Even UNESCO has media education literacy as one of its top priorities (Fedorov, 2014) and has launched several initiatives, including assessments of teacher training on the subject. In essence, *The Washington Post*'s TikTok efforts are a part of a larger effort to help the younger generation navigate information. However, TikTok is not the only platform being abused by bad actors. Many Facebook groups are echo-chambers filled with conspiracy theories and Instagram is filled with bots. Why not utilize an effort across all platforms to point out misinformation? This is particularly important because it has been found that the older generation is more likely to share false news than the younger generation (Funke, 2019; Guess et al., 2019).

This fact, combined with the finding that *The Washington Post* only posted Opinion pieces on Facebook, is concerning. It is almost as though they were playing into the platform's algorithm, which favors content that is more “emotional and provocative” (Merrill & Oremus, 2021, para. 2). This is a story *The Washington Post* themselves have covered in detail. Though Facebook says they have changed their algorithm since this assertion, perhaps *The Washington Post*'s Facebook audience has come to expect this content. We cannot say why *The Washington Post* only published Opinion about the

conflict on Facebook, but we can assume it plays well with their audience on that platform.

In addition, though *The Washington Post's* TikTok content did take a more serious, hard news tone after the invasion of Ukraine began, much of the content still contained small humorous elements. The TikTok team tried to maintain a semblance of what their audience expects of them on the platform. However, in times of war, the question is if this is the right frame for a media organization to communicate.

While *The Washington Post's* content can be consumed on all platforms, many people favor one platform over the other. Therefore, this study finds that the difference in framing found in *The Washington Post's* content posted to their Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok could allow consumers to see the Russia-Ukraine war in slightly different ways. The current study cannot say if the unevenness of framing can have consequences to a user's understanding of the war. Yet, we know from centuries of framing research that media frames can influence opinions.

8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

As an exploratory study, there are limitations to our approach. While studying framing across platforms for one media outlet makes this study novel, it is not generalizable as we only examined a two-week period and for one news organization. Further, there are difficulties with measuring content across different platforms with different formats. However, now that we understand what forms content can take and the dominant frames that have emerged, we can expand the study both in terms of time and scope, providing us with stronger data. We can also develop a coding book for quantitative analysis. Moving from an inductive to a deductive approach will allow us to compare and contrast *The Washington Post's* frames of the Russia-Ukraine war to other media organizations. Furthermore, we now have a better understanding of how to compare frames across platforms, allowing us to explore this method and deepen our understanding of cross platform frames for all media organizations.

9. CONCLUSION

News organizations, like *The Washington Post*, are tailoring content to the various social media platform audiences, which is a smart business decision; media organizations need strong audience numbers in order to financially survive. In media literacy courses, students are frequently told to review coverage from more than one media organization for a fuller picture of a situation. However, if one media organization posts different narratives on its different platforms, perhaps the key is to also look at more than one platform.

Academia has largely ignored how framing stories differently on various platforms can provide audiences different information on the same event. The literature does not show how one media outlet potentially covers stories of the same event

differently on its various platforms. As this study has shown, there could be major implications to an audience's understanding and opinion of a particular event if they only use one platform for the bulk of their news consumption.

Social media teams are often siloed by platform in the newsroom. Journalists who provide content to TikTok might not pay attention to the Instagram team's content. It is important to bring industry attention to issues of siloed teams and the importance of cross communication between those teams.

At the heart of this discussion is the larger question of journalism's role in society. If journalism should inform and tell people what they ought to know, then only providing parts of a story on one platform has large implications. By excluding important angles and information to certain parts of a media outlet's overall audience, knowledge gaps may develop. For example, if a media outlet does not tell their TikTok audience of the financial implications of a conflict, it creates a knowledge gap for that audience. One can certainly argue that items such as financial implications are important; it is a topic that all audiences, on all platforms, need to be aware of. If the media is only selecting parts of a story that is suitable for a platform's utility and that platform's audience, is it fulfilling the true information function of journalism? Is the medium more important than the message?

Kirstin Pellizzaro, Ph.D. is an assistant teaching professor who leads the multimedia journalism curriculum at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University. Pellizzaro earned her Doctorate from the Cronkite School in 2019. She studies the effects of social media platforms on the audience and journalist relationship through the lens for parasocial interaction. She also explores the different editorial decisions made per social media platform.

Email: Kirstin.Pellizzaro@asu.edu

ORCID 0000-0002-9258-9507

Madeleine Liseblad, Ph.D. is an associate professor in the Department of Journalism & Public Relations at California State University, Long Beach. She conducts primarily historical and qualitative research and is the author of *American Consultants and the Marketization of Television News in the United Kingdom* (New York: Peter Lang, 2020). Liseblad is the recipient of the 2022 Rising Scholar Award from American Journalism and she is the publications chair for *Journalism History*. Like Pellizzaro, Liseblad earned her Doctorate from the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University.

Email: Madeleine.Liseblad@csulb.edu

ORCID 0000-0003-1849-1066

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

REFERENCES

- Adler, N. (2022, March 3). Ukraine's Zelenskyy: A wartime statesman for the social media age. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/3/ukraines-zelenskyy-a-wartime-statesman-for-the-social-media-age>
- Alitavoli, R. (2020). Framing the news on the Syrian War: A comparative study of antiwar.com and cnn.com editorials. *Media, War & Conflict*, 13(4), 487-505.
- Auerbach, Y. & Bloch-Elkon, Y. (2005). Media Framing and Foreign Policy: The Elite Pressvis-à-vis US Policy in Bosnia, 1992-95. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42(1), 83-99. DOI 10.1177/0022343305049668
- Barnhart, B. (2022, March 2). Social media demographics to inform your brand's strategy in 2022. *Sprout Social*. <https://sproutsocial.com/insights/new-social-media-demographics/#facebook-demographics>
- Boney, N. (2019, February 13, 2019). Why 'NBC Nightly News' anchor Lester Holt is teaching teens about fact-checking. *USA Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/13/nbc-ester-holt-poynter-institute-mediawise-fact-checking/2857328002/>
- Capella, J., & Jamieson, K. (1997). "The cognitive bases for framing." In *Spiral of Cynicism: The press and the public good* (pp.58-86). Oxford University Press.
- Carpenter, S. (2007). U.S. elite and non-elite newspapers' portrayal of the Iraq war: a comparison of frames and source use. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 84(4), 761-776.
- Chayka, K. (2022, March 3). Watching the World's "First TikTok War." *The New Yorker*. <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/infinite-scroll/watching-the-worlds-first-tiktok-war>
- Dang, S., & Culliford, E. (2022, March 7). TikTok war: How Russia's invasion of Ukraine played to social media's youngest audience. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/technology/tiktok-war-how-russias-invasion-ukraine-played-social-medias-youngest-audience-2022-03-01/>
- de Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: theory and typology. *Information Design Journal and Document Design*, 13(1), 51-62.
- Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x>
- Fedorov, A. (2014). Media education literacy in the world: Trends. *European Researcher*, 167(1-2), 176-187.
- Fischer, S. (2022, February 8). News outlets ride TikTok engagement wave. *Axios Media Trends*. <https://www.axios.com/tiktok-news-abc-espn-bbb5c069-0ba2-474f-b9fe-afb76dfccdf9.html>
- Fleischer, A. (2023). The Kosovo War and *The Washington Post*: Bombings and Alignments. *Media, War & Conflict*, 16(3), 459-481.

- Funke, D. (2019, January 15). Older Americans share more fake news than young people. But they also share more facts. *Poynter*. Retrieved from <https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2019/older-americans-share-more-fake-news-than-young-people-but-they-also-share-more-facts/>
- Gallucci, N. (2021, March 22). Dave Jorgenson chats about life as *The Washington Post* TikTok guy, his love of Spam, and more. *Mashable*. <https://mashable.com/article/dave-jorgenson-washington-post-tik-tok-guy-interview>
- Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). "The changing political culture of affirmative action." In *Research in political ideology* (pp. 137-176). JAI Press.
- Gamson, W.A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: a constructionist approach. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95(1), 1-37.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Harper & Row.
- Gruley, J., & Duvall, C.S. (2012) The evolving narrative of the Darfur conflict as represented in The New York Times and The Washington Post, 2003–2009. *GeoJournal* 77, 29–46. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-010-9384-4>
- Guess, A., Nagler, J., & Tucker J. (2019, January 9). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook. *Science Advances*. <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586>
- Guzman, A. L. (2016). Evolution of News Frames During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Critical Discourse Analysis of Fox News's and CNN's Framing of Protesters, Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 93(1), 80-98.
- Hookway, J., & Trofimov, Y. (2022, March 5). What's Happening in Ukraine? Why Russia Is Invading and What Putin Wants. *Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-whats-happening-11646157211?mod=livecoverage_web
- Iannarino, N. T., Veil, S. R., & Cotton, A. J. (2015). Bringing Home the Crisis: How US Evening News Framed the 2011 Japan Nuclear Crisis: Bringing Home the Crisis. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 23(3), 169–181. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12068>
- Joseph Ferguson joins The Post's Video team as a TikTok host and producer. (2024, January 9). *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/2024/01/09/joseph-ferguson-joins-posts-video-team-tiktok-host-producer/>
- Ke, J. (2008). Did the US media reflect the reality of the Kosovo War in an objective manner? A case study of *The Washington Post* and *The Washington Times*. *Intercultural Communication Studies*, 17(1), 157-168.
- Keith, S., Schwalbe, C. B., & Silcock, B. W. (2009). Visualizing cross-media coverage: Picturing war across platforms during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. *Atlantic Journal of Communication*, 17(1), 1-18.

- Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1990). Mimicking political debate with survey questions: The case of white opinion on affirmative action for blacks. *Social Cognition*, 8(1), 73-103.
- Kirby, P. (2022, February 26). Why is Russia invading Ukraine and what does Putin want? *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>
- Langer, A. I., & Gruber, J. B. (2021). Political agenda setting in the hybrid media system: why legacy media still matters a great deal. *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 26(2), 313-340.
- Lecheler, S., & de Vreese, C. H. (2019). *News framing effects*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315208077>
- Lorenz, T. (2022, March 11). The White House is briefing TikTok stars about the war in Ukraine. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/tik-tok-ukraine-white-house/>
- Matsa, K.E. (2023, November 15). More Americans are getting news on TikTok, bucking the trend seen on most other social media sites. *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/11/15/more-americans-are-getting-news-on-tiktok-bucking-the-trend-seen-on-most-other-social-media-sites/>
- Matsa, K. E., & Liedke, J. (2022, September 20). Social Media and News Fact Sheet. *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet>
- McLeod, D., & Detenber, B. (1999). Framing effects of television news coverage of social protest. *Journal of Communication*, 49(3), 3-23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02802.x>
- Meek, A. (2021, August 28). The Washington Post, A 143-Year-Old Newspaper, Just Hit 1M TikTok Followers. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/andymeek/2021/08/28/the-washington-post-a-143-year-old-newspaper-just-hit-1m-tiktok-followers/?sh=236860ff52e7>
- Merrill, J. B., & Oremus, W. (2021, October 26). Five points for anger, one for a 'like': How Facebook's formula fostered rage and misinformation. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/26/facebook-angry-emoji-algorithm/>
- Mhanna, M., & Rodan, D. (2019). Ungrievable lives: Australian print media portrayals of Palestinian casualties during the Gaza War of 2014. *Australian Journalism Review*, 14(1), 117-130.
- Miranda, G. (2022, February 25). Why is Russia invading Ukraine?: History, anti-West sentiments play roles leading up to this incursion. *Arizona Republic*, A5.
- Moore, C. (2022, February 26). A self-indulgent West has allowed Putin to start re-erecting the Iron Curtain. *Daily Telegraph*, p. 24.
- Mulvey, S. (2022, February 26). Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky: The comedian president who is rising to the moment. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59667938>

- Newman, N. (2023, June 14). Overview and key findings of the 2023 Digital News Report. *The Reuters Institute*. <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/dnr-executive-summary>
- Newman, N. (2022, December 8). How publishers are learning to create and distribute news on TikTok. *The Reuters Institute*. <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/how-publishers-are-learning-create-and-distribute-news-tiktok>
- Porpora, D.V., Nikolaev, A., & Hagerman, J. (2010). Abuse, torture, frames and The Washington Post. *Journal of Communication*, 60(2), 254-270. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01481.x>
- Poynter (n.d.). MediaWise: Teen Fact-Checking Network. Retrieved from <https://www.poynter.org/mediawise/programs/tfcn/>
- Roberts, C. M. (1989). *In the shadow of power: the story of The Washington Post*. Seven Locks Press.
- Rudolph, R. M. (2019). Thinking about engaging North Korea: A study on the framing of the U.S. human rights public discourse in the Washington Post and New York Times between 2001 and 2017. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 6(3), 308-351.
- Tuchman, G. (1978). *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*. Free Press.
- Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 103-122. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x>
- Schwalbe, C. B., Keith, S., & Silcock, B. W. (2018). "Researching the frames of still and moving images across media platforms: Challenges and opportunities." In *Doing news framing analysis II: Empirical and theoretical perspectives* (pp. 221-246). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315642239>
- Semetko, H., & Valkenburg, P. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 93-109.
- Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. D. (1996). *Mediating the message*. Longman Publishers.
- Sotiraki, D. (2023). *Media Framing by The Washington Post on TikTok: Shaping Public Perception of the Ukraine Conflict* [Master's thesis, Malmö University]. <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1798787&dswid=9519>
- Stabile, D., Benbow-Pfalzgraf, T., & Smith, R. (2010). The Washington Post Company. In *International Directory of Company Histories*, vol. 109 (pp. 577-583). Gale.
- The Washington Post Announces Newsroom Expansion Including Foreign Bureaus, Breaking News Hubs in Europe and Asia. (2020, December 21). *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/2020/12/21/washington-post-announces-newsroom-expansion-including-new-foreign-bureaus-breaking-news-hubs-europe-asia/>
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022a, March 3). A guide to watching videos with a critical eye. #factcheck [Video]. TikTok. <https://www.tiktok.com/@washingtonpost/video/7070939135447584046>

- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022b, March 2). “Assassination plot against Zelensky was foiled and unit sent to kill him was ‘destroyed’...” [Photograph]. Instagram. https://www.instagram.com/p/Cam4sgaNqJ_/
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022c, February 28). Have a question? Ask below! #ukraine #russia #invasion [Video]. TikTok. <https://www.tiktok.com/@washingtonpost/video/7069816791437970730>
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022d, February 28). No matter how devastating, enlightening or enraging a post is, wait to share it. Assume everything is suspect until you confirm its authenticity. #euphoria #medialiteracy [Video]. TikTok. <https://www.tiktok.com/@washingtonpost/video/7069904848250064174?lang=en>
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022e, March 3). Reply to @krystalm4 Reuters fact checked the images, saying they do not show Zelensky fighting. (03/03/22) #factcheck #medialiteracy #osint. <https://www.tiktok.com/@washingtonpost/video/7071009047633218859>
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022f, March 1). Western companies are cutting ties and suspending business dealings as the conflict continues in Eastern Europe (03/01/22) #bp #gm #shell [Video]. TikTok. https://www.tiktok.com/@washingtonpost/video/7070252100705422634?is_from_webapp=1
- The Washington Post [@washingtonpost]. (2022g, March 2). “What’s Putin Thinking?” [Photograph]. Instagram. <https://www.instagram.com/p/Camf0viLobC/>
- van Dooremalen, T., & Uitermark, J. (2021). The framing of 9/11 in American, French, and Dutch national newspapers (2001–2015): An inductive approach to studying events. *International Sociology*, 36(3), 464–488. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580920966829>
- Zhang, L., Zhang, M., & Wang, K. (2020). Media Literacy Education and Curriculum Integration: A Literature Review. *International Journal of Contemporary Education*, 3(1), 55–64. <https://doi.org/10.11114/ijce.v3i1.4769>